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PREFACE
This final report was prepared by cognizant personnel at the Douglas
Aircraft Company, a division of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, under NASA
Contract No. NASI-15508. The contract was administered by the NASALangley
Research Center. Mr. J. L. Humble of NASAwas the Douglas Aircraft Technical
Monitor and Mr. R. J. Huston was the overall Program Manager for NASA.
The work was performed under the general supervision of Dr. H. C.
Schjelderup. The following Douglas personnel made significant contributions
to the program:
Electrical/Electronic Component Characterization - C. Q. Cook, E. Snyder
Fiber Transfer Functions - B. Henning
Potential Equipment Exposure - J. Hosford
Equipment Vulnerability Assessment - D. L. Gilles, C. W. Swanstrom
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SECTION1
INTRODUCTION
The use of carbon/graphite composite material in aircraft structure is
increasing every year and the increase is expected to continue for the fore-
seeable future. Concern has been expressed recently over the potential hazard
to electrical and electronic devices should there be a release of free fiber
due to a crash and fire. NASAestablished a comprehensive study program to
estimate the expected dollar loss due to accidental release of carbon/graphite
fibers. Work programs were conducted by a variety of firms and Government
agencies to acquire data as to exposure and equipment sensitivity in order to
provide data for a risk analysis.
This report presents the results of the following studies assigned to
Douglas:
e DC-9/DC-IO Electrical/Electronic Component Characterization
• DC-9 and DC-IO Fiber Transfer Functions
e Potential for Transport Aircraft Equipment Exposure to Carbon Fibers
• Equipment Vulnerability Assessment.

SECTION2
SUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONS
This report was prepared under contract to NASAand contains information
necessary to evaluate the risk- to Douglas-manufactured commercial jet air-
craft - caused by the accidental release of free carbon/graphite fibers from
composite material. Detailed data from this report and similar reports pre-
pared by Boeing Commercial Airplane Companyand Lockheed California Company
have been used by Arthur D. Little Inc. and Operations Research Institute Inc.
to determine their estimate of the national risk factor.
Since the major threat would be to the aircraft avionics, the first two
tasks undertaken were to determine entry path and filtration to the avionics
compartment, and to classify the avionics equipment as to its vulnerability.
Further tasks included an assessment of the average number of aircraft on the
ground at selected airports during the day and at night and the vulnerability
configuration of these aircraft, i.e., the probability of avionic equipment
failure, the cost of maintenance, and the hazard to the aircraft.
Considerable interface with NASArisk analysis contractors, Arthur D.
Little Inc., and Operations Research Institute Inc., is evident, and the use
of their input is gratefully acknowledged.
This study established that there is only a negligible increase in risk,
either now or projected to 1993, for the DC-9 and DC-IO fleets due to acci-
dental_release of free carbon/graphite fibers.
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SECTION3
DC-9/DC-IO ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICOMPONENTCHARACTERIZATION
3.1 Introduction
The identification, tabulation, and categorization of the DC-9 and DC-IO
electrical and electronic components for carbon fiber (CF) risk assessment
was accomplished in compliance with NASAContract NASI-15508.
3.2 Selection of Equipment for Categorization
The preliminary DC-9 Master Component List and the DC-IO Master Component
List identifies all Line Replaceable Units (LRU) that have reliability, mainte-
nance, or cost significance. The components evaluated by this study were
obtained from these lists and are identified on the Component Data Sheets.
The Component Data Sheets were assembled by ATAChapters which are identified
in Table 3-I. Reflected in Tables 3-2 and 3-3 are the number of data sheets
and the number of units open/closed for the DC-IO/DC-9 aircraft. These data
sheets were previously submitted to NASAvia letters CI-091-ACEE-537, dated
9 November 1978 and CI-091-ACEE-153, dated 26 March 1979 and are not included
herein.
3.3 Component Data Sheets
The information contained in the data sheets relates primarily to internal
and external box construction, ventilation, voltage and power requirements,
and location of the equipment in the aircraft. Sheets containing this data
were completed for those components whose enclosure construction was open,
particular care for completeness being given to those units regarded as candi-
dates for CF testing. The data sheet form utilized was reviewed by NASA.
Data sheets for equipment whose enclosure construction was regarded as
sealed were not completed in detail although exceptions are found. While
sealed equipment is not regarded as being subject to CF influence, component
TABLE 3-1
ATA INDEX (3-DIGIT)
21-00 AIR CONDITIONING 28-00 FUEL SYSTEM 35-00 OXYGEN 57-00 WING
20 DISTRIBUTION 10 STORAGE 10 CREW 20 AUXILIARY STRUCTURE
30 PRESSURIZATION CONTROL 20 DISTRIBUTION 20 PASSENGER 50 FLIGHT SURFACES
40 HEATING 30 DUMP 30 PORTABLE 71-00 POWER PLANT10 COWLING
50 COOLING 40 INDICATING 36-00 PNEUMATIC 72-00 ENGINE
60 TEMPERATURE CONTROL 29-00 HYDRAULIC POWER 10 DISTRIBUTION 73-00 ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL
22-00 AUTO FLIGHT 10 MAIN 20 INDICATING 10 DISTRIBUTION10 AUTOPILOT 20 AUXILIARY
20 SPEED ATTITUDE CORRECTION 30 INDICATING 38-00 WATER/WASTE 20 CONTROLLING
30 AUTO THROTTLE/SPEED CONTROL (AT/SC) 30-00 ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION 10 POTABLE 30 INDICATING
40 SYSTEM MONITOR 10 AIRFOIL 30 WASTE DISPOSAL 74-00 IGNITION1 ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY
23-00 COMMUNICATIONS 20 AIR INTAKES 40 AIR SUPPLY 20 DISTRIBUTION
10 HIGH FREQUENCY (HF) 30 PITOT AND STATIC 49-00 AIRBORNE AUXILIARY POWER 30 SWITCHING
20 VERY HIGH FREQUENCY (VHF) 40 WINDOWS AND WINDSHIELDS 10 POWER PLANT 75-00 AIR
30 PASSENGER ADDRESS AND ENTERTAINMENT 70 WATER LINES 20 ENGINE 10 ENGINE ANTI-ICiNG (SERIES 20 ONLY)40 INTERPHONE
50 AUDIO INTEGRATING 80 DETECTION 30 ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL 20 ACCESSORY COOLING
60 STATIC DISCHARGING 31-00 INSTRUMENTS 40 IGNITION/STARTING 30 COMPRESSOR CONTROL
70 VOICE RECORDERS 10 PANELS 50 AIR 40 INDICATING
24-00 ELECTRICAL POWER 20 INDEPENDENT INSTRUMENTS 60 ENGINE CONTROLS 76-00 ENGINE CONTROLS
10 GENERATOR DRIVE 30 RECORDERS 70 INDICATING 10 POWER CONTROL
20 AC GENERATION 40 COMPUTERS 80 EXHAUST 20 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
30 DC GENERATION 50 CENTRAL WARNING SYSTEMS 90 OIL 77-00 ENGINE INDICATING
40 EXTERNAL POWER 32-00 LANDING GEAR 52-00 DOORS 10 POWER
50 ELECTRICAL LOAD DISTRIBUTION 10 MAIN GEAR AND DOORS 10 PASSENGER/CREW 20 TEMPERATURE
25-00 EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS 20 NOSE GEAR AND DOORS 30 CARGO 30 ANALYZERS
10 FLIGHT COMPARTMENT 30 EXTENSION AND RETRACTION 40 SERVICE 78-00 EXHAUST
20 PASSENGER COMPARTMENT 40 WHEELS AND BRAKES 50 FIXED INTERIOR 30 THRUST REVERSER
O') 30 BUFFET/GALLEY 50 STEERING 70 DOOR WARNING 79-00 OIL
40 LAVATORIES 60 POSITION AND WARNING 80 LANDING GEAR 10 STORAGE20 DISTRIBUTION
50 CARGO AND ACCESSORY COMPARTMENTS 33-00 LIGHTS 53-00 FUSELAGE 30 INDICATING
60 EMERGENCY 10 FLIGHT COMPARTMENT 50 AERODYNAMIC FAIRINGS 80-00 STARTING26-00 FIRE PROTECTION 20 PASSENGER COMPARTMENTS
10 FIRE DETECTION 30 CARGO AND SERVICE COMPARTMENTS 54-00 NACELLES/PYLONS STRUCTURE 82-00 WATER INJECTION (P&W)
20 FIRE EXTINGUISHING 40 EXTERIOR 50 FILLETS/FAIRINGS 10 STORAGE
27-00 FLIGHT CONTROLS 50 EMERGENCY LIGHTING 55-00 STABILIZERS 20 DISTRIBUTION
10 AILERON 20 ELEVATORS 30 DUMPING
20 RUDDER 34-00 NAVIGATION 40 INDICATING10 FLIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL DATA 40 RUDDER
30 ELEVATOR 20 ATTITUDE AND DIRECTION 50 ATTACH FITTINGS
40 HORIZONTALSTABILIZERS 30 LANDING AND TAXIING AIDS 56-00 WINDOWS
50 FLAPS 40 INDEPENDENT POSITION DETERMINING 10 FLIGHT COMPARTMENT60 SPOILER
70 DAMPERS 50 DEPENDENT POSITION DETERMINING 20 CABIN
80 LIFT AUGMENTING 60 POSITION COMPUTING 30 DOOR
TABLE 3-2
DC-10DATASHEETS/CHAPTERBREAKDOWN
CHAPTER DATA SHEETS UNITS OPEN UNITS CLOSED
21 AIR CONDITIONING 38 5 33
22 AUTO FLIGHT 28 3 25
23 COMMUNICATIONS 30 12 18
24 ELECTRICAL POWER 35 8 27
25 EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS 11 2 9
26 FIRE PROTECTION 6 2 4
27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 10 0 10
28 FUELSYSTEM 13 0 13
29 HYDRAULIC POWER 17 1 16
30 ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION 12 2 10
31 INSTRUMENTS 16 5 11
32 LANDING GEAR 14 2 12
33 LIGHTS 8 2 6
34 NAVIGATION 56 23 33
35 OXYGEN 3 0 3
36 PNEUMATIC 10 3 7
38 WATER/WASTE 5 0 5
49 AIRBORNE AUXILIARY POWER 10 0 10
52 DOORS 0 0 0
53 FUSELAGE 0 0 0
54 NACELLES/PYLONS STRUCTURE 0 0 0
55 STABILIZERS 0 0 0
56 WINDOWS 0 0 0
57 WING 0 0 0
71 POWER PLANT 2 0 2
72 ENGINE 0 0 0
73 ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL 10 1 9
74 IGNITION 2 1 1
75 AIR 2 0 2
76 ENGINE CONTROLS 1 0 1
77 ENGINE INDICATING 9 0 9
78 EXHAUST 1 0 1
79 OIL 6 0 6
80 STARTING 2 0 2
82 WATER INJECTION (P&W) 2 0 2
359 72 287
TABLE 3-3
DC-9 DATA SHEETS/CHAPTER BREAKDOWN
CHAPTER DATA SHEETS UNITS OPEN UNITS CLOSED
21 AIR CONDITIONING 21 0 21
22 AUTO FLIGHT 16 0 16
23 COMMUNICATIONS 26 12 14
24 ELECTRICAL POWER 20 9 11
25 EQUIPMENT FURNISHINGS 5 0 5
26 FIRE PROTECTION 2 1 1
27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 5 0 5
28 FUE L SYSTEM 5 0 5
29 HYDRAULIC POWER 3 0 3
30 ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION 3 1 2
31 INSTRUMENTS 4 0 4
32 LANDING GEAR 7 2 5
33 LIGHTS 11 1 10
34 NAVIGATION 64 28 36
35 OXYGEN 0 0 0
36 PNEUMATIC 3 0 3
38 WATER/WASTE 0 0 0
49 AIRBORNE AUXILIARY POWER 10 0 10
52 DOORS 0 0 0
53 FUSELAGE 0 0 0
54 NACELLES/PYLONS STRUCTURE 0 0 O
55 STABILIZERS 0 0 0
56 WINDOWS O 0 0
57 WING 0 0 0
71 POWER PLANT 0 0 0
72 ENGINE 0 0 0
73 ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL 7 0 7
74 IGNITION 0 0 0
75 AIR 0 0 0
76 ENGINE CONTROLS 0 0 0
77 ENGINE INDICATING 5 0 5
78 EXHAUST 2 0 2
79 OIL 7 0 7
80 STARTING 0 0 0
82 WATER INJECTION (P&W) 0 0 0
226 54 172
data sheets for these equipments were included in the report, both for report
completeness and to providevisibility into the number and range of the equip-
ment examined.
3.4 Observations/Recommendation
The study shows 20 percent of the DC-IO components and 23 percent of the
DC-9 components examined have open construction. Most of these are found in
Chapter 23, Communication; Chapter 24, Electrical Power; and Chapter 34,
Navigation.
The guidelines of NASATechnical Memorandum78788 were used to categorize
these open units. This memorandum, "A Summaryof Data Related to the Carbon/
Graphite Giber Electrical Hazard Resulting from Accidental Release from Air-
craft (U)," dated November 1978, states that in general the nature of the
hazard is determined by the voltage and power level at which the equipment
operates. Equipment operation is broken down into three broad regimes: low
voltage, medium voltage, and high voltage. Table 3-4, received from NASA
during Douglas/NASA discussions, summarizes the voltage regimes and the typical
effect that carbon fibers are likely to cause. The open units from the Douglas
study are identified and categorized in Tables 3-5 and 3-6 in accordance with
this voltage/power criteria; hence, the equipment in the principal problem
areas of low-voltage, low-power; medium-voltage, high-power; and high-voltage,
high-power categories is readily identified.
Tables 3-7 and 3-8 identify by chapter eachcomponent determined by the
study to have open construction, thereby warranting consideration for CF test-
ing. In addition to the internal/external box construction, ventilation, and
installation location, the recommendation of a unit as a test candidate also
considered representation from various voltage and power regimes, type of
equipment and its use, ease of testing, and any unique feature of a unit such
as internal fan, conventional wiring, etc. Tables 3-7 and 3-8 identify those
units thought to be representative of test candidates.
TABLE 3-4
TYPICAL FIBER EFFECTS
VOLTAGE RANGE LOW POWER (UP TO 100W) HIGH POWER (ABOVE 100W)
LOW
(0 TO 30 VOLTS) SUSTAINED SHORTS SUSTAINED SHORTS
FIBER NOT BURNED FIBER NOT BURNED
MALFUNCTIONS NO EQUIPMENT DAMAGE
NO LOCAL DAMAGE
MEDIUM
(30 TO 1000 VOLTS) SPARKING OR SHORTS SOME SUSTAINED ARCS
POSSIBLE FIBER BURN FIBER BURNS
TRANSIENTS TRANSIENTS
BLOWN FUSES BLOWN FUSES
STRESSED COMPONENTS STRESSED COMPONENTS
LOW DAMAGE POTENTIAL DAMAGE USUALLY REPAIRABLE
HIGH
(_1000.VOLTS) SPARKS, NO SUSTAINED ARCS SUSTAINED ARCS
LOW VOLTAGE CORONA CORONA
TRANSIENTS FLASHOVE R
INTERRUPTIONS MAY BE SEVERE DAMAGE
TABLE 3-5
DC-10OPEN UNITS OPERATING REGIME
* LOW VOLTAGE -- LOW POWER LOW VOLTAGE -- HIGH POWER
CABIN ALT WARN -- ANEROID PRESSURE SWITCH
CARGO COMPARTMENT TEMP SENSOR
ZONE TEMP INDTCATOR SENSOR
DUCT TEMP INDICATOR SENSOR
VHF TRANSCEIVER (2)
PASSENGER ADDRESS AMPLIFIER
HANDSET
AUDIO CONTROL PANEL
SWITCH ASSEMBLY, ROLLER CONTROL
BATTERY/LIGHT, EVAC EQUIPMENT
SMOKE DETECTOR
SMOKE DETECTOR INDICATOR
THERMAL SWITCH, ANTI-ICE
PROXIMITY ELECT UNIT
WARN AND CAUTION CONTROLLER
HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR
MARKER BEACON RECEIVER (2)
INERTIAL SENSOR DISPLAY UNIT
VOR/ILS RECEIVER (2)
ADF RECEIVER
LIGHT SWITCH
I
MEDIUM VOLTAGE -- LOW POWER * MEDIUM VOLTAGE -- HIGH POWER
TAPE ANNOUNCEMENT REPRODUCER STANDBY CABIN PRESSURE CONTROLLER
MAIN MULTIPLEXER FLIGHT GUIDANCE PITCH COMPUTER
SUB MULTIPLEXER FLIGHT GUIDANCE ROLL COMPUTER
OVERHEAD DECODER FLIGHT GUIDANCE YAW COMPUTER
BATTERY VENT PUMP PA AMPLIFIER
FLIGHT DATA ENTRY PANEL TIMER/DECODER, PASSENGER ENTERTAINMENT
FLIGHT DATA ACQUISITION UNIT AC GENERATOR
WEIGHT AND BALANCE COMPUTER 1200 VA STATIC INVERTER
INDICATOR/CONTROL PANEL (WT AND BAL) TURBINE GENERATOR ASSEMBLY
CENTRAL AURAL WARNING UNIT TRANSFORMER/RECTIFIER POWER SUPPLY
ANTI-SKID CONTROL UNIT BATTERY CHARGER
VERTICAL GYRO GROUND POWER RECEPTACLE
STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR TRANSFORMER, INSTRUMENT BUS
ILS RECEIVER AUX PUMP, HYDRAULIC POWER
RADIO ALTIMETER R/T UNIT WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICING CONTROLLER
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING COMPUTER LAMP DIMMER
VOR RECEIVER CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER
FLIGHT DATA STORAGE UNIT INERTIAL NAVIGATION UNIT
CONTROL SWITCH DME (2)
FUEL FLOW ELECTRONICS UNIT ATC TRANSPONDER
ENGINE IGNITION SWITCH NAVIGATION COMPUTER UNIT
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM CONTROLLER
HIGH VOLTAGE -- LOW POWER * HIGH VOLTAGE -- HIGH POWER
WEATHER RADAR INDICATOR HF TRANSCEIVER
WEATHER RADAR R/T UNIT
CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT (RNAV)
*PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONCERN
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TABLE 3-6
DC-9 OPEN UNITS OPERATING REGIME
* LOW VOLTAGE -- LOW POWER LOW VOLTAGE -- HIGH POWER
VHF TRANSCEIVER (2) NAV INSTRUMENT FAILURE MONITOR
PA AMPLIFIER
CABIN SPEAKER
PILOT'S CALL BELL
MECHANIC CALL HORN
AUDIO PANEL
JACK PANEL
FLIGHT COMP SPEAKER
FLIGHT INTERPHONE AMPLIFIER
SMOKE DETECTOR
ANTI-SKID CONTROL BOX
PROXIMITY SW CONTROL
MASTER CONTROLLER
MARKER BEACON RECEIVER (2)
VOR/ILS RECEIVER
ADF RECEIVER (2)
MEDIUM VOLTAGE -- LOW POWER * MEDIUM VOLTAGE -- HIGH POWER
TAPE REPRODUCER WINDSHIELD TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER
BATTERY VENT FAN AC GENERATOR
INSTRUMENT AMPLIFIER GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL
VERTICAL GYRO BUS CONTROL PANEL
FLIGHT DIR ROLL COMPUTER AC REGULATOR
FLIGHT DIR PITCH COMPUTER AC RELAY
NAV COMPARATOR UNIT EMERGENCY INVERTER
RATE-OF-TURN RACK TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER
STANDBY HORIZON INDICATOR BATTERY CHARGER
RADIO ALTIMETER R/T (2) TOTAL AIR TEMPERATURE SENSOR
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING COMPUTER INSTRUMENT AMPLIFIER RACK
FLIGHT DIRECTOR COMPUTER NAV SMART RACK
NAV COMPARATOR UNIT
SPEED COMMAND COMPARATOR
HIGH VOLTAGE -- LOW POWER * HIGH VOLTAGE -- HIGH POWER
WEATHER RADAR INDICATOR (2) HF TRANSCEIVER
ATC TRANSPONDER (2)
DME INTERROGATOR
WEATHER RADAR R/T UNIT
*PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONCERN
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TABLE 3-7
DC-IO TEST CANDIDATE DETERMINATION
TEST CANDIDATE
CHAPTER COMPONENT YES NO REMARKS
21-31-05 STANDBY CABIN PRESSURE CONTROLLER X OPENING IS SCREENED AND FILTERED, REDUNDANT UNIT
21-33-03 ANEROID PRESSURE SWITCH (CABIN X SWITCH ENCLOSED, TYPICAL EXTERNAL SCREW TERMINALS
ALT WARN)
21-41-02 CARGO COMPARTMENT TEMP SENSOR X CARGO COMPARTMENT HEAT -- SIMPLE COIL SENSOR
21-64-02 ZONE TEMP INDICATOR SENSOR X COMPARTMENT HEAT SENSOR -- SIMPLE COIL SENSOR
21-64-03 DUCT TEMP INDICATOR SENSOR X DUCT TEMPERATURE SENSOR -- SIMPLE COIL SENSOR
22-11-01 FLIGHT GUIDANCE PITCH COMPUTER X DIFFICULT TO SIMULATE/TEST
22-12-01 FLIGHT GUIDANCE ROLL COMPUTER X DIFFICULT TO SIMULATE/TEST
22-13-01 FLIGHT GUIDANCE YAW COMPUTER X DIFFICULT TO SIMULATE/TEST
23-11-01 HF TRANSCEIVER X FORCED COOLING, HIGH VOLTAGE, HIGH POWER
23-21-01 VHF TRANSCEIVER (2 LISTED) X LOW VOLTAGE, LOW POWER, TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION
23-31-02 PASSENGER ADDRESS AMPLIFIER X PASSENGER ADDRESS
23-31-02 PA AMPLIFIER X PASSENGER ADDRESS
23-31-05 HANDSET X PASSENGER ADDRESS
23-32-01 REPRODUCER_ TAPE; ANNOUNCEMENT X PASSENGER ADDRESS
23-33-01 MAIN MULTIPLEXER X PASSENGER ENTERTAINMENT
23-33-02 SUB MULTIPLEXER X PASSENGER ENTERTAINMENT
23-33-03 TIMER/DECODER, SECTION X PASSENGER ENTERTAINMENT
23-33-06 OVERHEAD DECODER X PASSENGER ENTERTAINMENT
23-51-05 AUDIO PANEL CONTROL X FLIGHT INTERPHONE
TABLE 3-7 (CONT)
DC-10 TEST CANDI DATE DETERMINATION
TEST CANDIDATE
CHAPTER COMPONENT YES NO REMARKS
24-21-61 AC GENERATOR X ENGINE GENERATOR
24-24-01 1200 VA STATIC INVERTER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, HIGH POWER -- REPRESENTATIVE
24-25-01 TURBINE GENERATOR ASSEMBLY X IN FLIGHT USE ONLY -- EMERGENCY HYDRAULIC POWER
24-31-01 TRANSFORMER/RECTIFIER POWER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, HIGH POWER- CONVENTIONAL WIRING
SUPPLY
24-34-03 BATTERY CHARGER X NOT USED CONTINUOUSLY
24-35-01 BATTERY VENT PUMP X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
24-41-03 GROUND POWER RECEPTACLE X GROUND OPERATION ONLY
24-51-01 TRANSFORMER, INSTRUMENT BUS X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, HIGH POWER -- INSULATED WINDINGS
25-52-05 SWITCH ASSEMBLY, CONTROL, ROLLER X NOT CRITICAL, CARGO LOADING SYSTEM
25-61-06 BATTERY AND LIGHT X EVACUATION EQUIPMENT
26-1401 SMOKE DETECTOR X CARGO COMPARTMENT, CASE OPEN, COMPONENTS SEALED
26-15-02 SMOKE DETECTOR INDICATOR X LIGHT
29-21-O1 PUMP, ELECT MOTOR DRIVE X HYDRAULIC POWER BACKUP-- CHECKED ON GROUND
30-22-05 THERMAL SWITCH X TYPICAL EXTERNAL SCREW TERMINAL CONNECTIONS
30-41-01 WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICING CONTROLLER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, HIGH POWER
TABLE 3-7 (CONT)
DC-10TEST CANDIDATE DETERMINATION
TEST CANDIDATE
CHAPTER COMPONENT YES NO REMARKS
31-31-04 FLIGHT DATA ENTRY PANEL X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
31-31-05 FLIGHT DATA ACQUISITION UNIT X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
31-41-01 WEIGHT AND BALANCE COMPUTER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
31-41-02 INDICATOR/CONTROL PANEL (WT AND BAL) X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
31-51-01 CENTRAL AURAL WARNING UNIT X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
32-45-01 ANTISKID CONTROL UNIT X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
32-61-05 PROXIMITY ELECT UNIT X LOW VOLTAGE, LOW POWER° REQUIRED/CHECKED AT DISPATCH
33-11-04 LAMP DIMMER X LOCATED FLT ENG PANEL -- INSTRUMENT LIGHT CONTROL
33o15-01 WARN AND CAUTION CONTROLLER X BASICALLY A SWITCHING BOX
34-16-01 CENTRAL AI R DATA COMPUTER X UNPROTECTED WIRE WRAP MOTHERBOARD
34-22-01 HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR X ESSENTIALLY PROTECTED
34-23-01 VERTICAL GYRO X ESSENTIALLY PROTECTED
34-28-01 STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR X HAS FI LTERS, BACK-UP UNIT
34-31-01 MARKER BEACON RECEIVER (2) X DRAW-THROUGH COOLING, METAL CHASSIS
34-32-01 ILS RECEIVER X TYPICAL RADIO CONSTRUCTION
34-41-01 WEATHER RADAR R/T UNIT X HAS FILTER, DIFFICULT TO TEST
34-41-03 WEATHER RADAR INDICATOR X HIGH VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON_3RITICAL CATEGORY,
HARD TO TEST
34-42-01 RADIO ALTIMETER R/T UNIT X TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION, FORCED COOLING
TABLE 3-7 (CONT)
DC-10 TEST CANDIDATE DETERMINATION
TEST CANDIDATE
CHAPTER COMPONENT YES NO REMARKS
34-43-03 INERTIAL NAVIGATION UNIT X HIGH COST ITEM; DIFFICULT TO TEST
34-43-11 INE RTIAL SENSOR DISPLAY UNIT X REQUl RES INTERFACING EQUIPMENT TO TEST
34-45-01 GROUND PROXIMITY WARN COMPUTER X TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION
34-51-01 VOR/ILS RECEIVER (2) X TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION° DUAL FUNCTION
34-51-01 VOR RECEIVER X TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION, FORCED COOLING
34-52-01 DME (2) X FORCED COOLING, INTERNAL FAN
34-53-01 ADF RECEIVER X TYPICAL RADIO CONSTRUCTION
34-54-01 ATC TRANSPONDER X REPRESENTATIVE TEST UNIT
34-61-01 NAVIGATION COMPUTER X HIGH COST ITEM, DI FFICULT TO TEST
34-61-02 TAPE CARTRIDGE UNIT X REQUIRES INTERFACING EQUIPMENT TO TEST
34-61-03 CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT X REQUIRES INTERFACING EQUIPMENT TO TEST, HIGH COST
36-10-01 CONTROL SWITCH, PNEUMATIC X TYPICAL ROTARY SWITCH, EXTERNAL TERMINALS
36-23-04 LIGHT SWITCH X TYPICAL SWITCH
36-27-06 CONTROLLE R, PNEUMATIC SYSTEM X REDUNDANT UNIT
73-31-03 FUEL FLOW ELECTRONICS UNIT X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER -- NON-CRITICAL REGIME
74-30-01 ENGINE IGNITION SWITCH X TYPICAL ROTARY SWITCH, EXTERNAL TERMINALS
TABLE 3-8
DC-9TEST CANDIDATE DETERMINATION
TEST CANDIDATE
I CHAPTER COMPONENT YES NO REMARKS
23-11-01 HF TRANSCEIVER X ALSO A DC-10 CANDIDATE
23-21-01 VHF TRANSCEIVER (2 LISTED) X ALSO A DC-10 CANDIDATE
23-31-02 PASSENGER ADDRESS AMPLIFIER X LOW VOLTAGE-LOW POWER, TYPICAL CANDIDATE
23-31-05 CABIN SPEAKER X PASSENGER ADDRESS
23-32-01 TAPE REPRODUCER X PASSENGER ENTERTAINMENT
23-41-02 PILOT CALL BELL X INTERPHONE
23-41-03 MECHANIC CALL HORN X INTERPHONE
23-52-01 AUDIO PANEL X INTERPHONE
23-52-02 JACK PANEL X INTERPHONE
23-52-03 FLIGHT COMPARTMENT SPEAKER X INTERPHONE
23-52435 FLIGHT INTERPHONE AMPLIFIER X INTERPHONE
_1 24-21-01 AC GENERATOR X ENGINE GENERATOR
24-21-02 GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL X PART OF POWER GENERATION SYSTEM
24-21-03 BUS CONTROL PANEL X PART OF POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
24-21-05 AC REGULATOR X PART OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
24-21-06 AC RELAY X PART OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
24-23-01 EMERGENCY INVERTER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE-HIGH POWER-ALSO A DC-10 CANDIDATE
24-31-01 TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE-HIGH POWER-ALSO A DC-10 CANDIDATE
24-31433 BATTERY CHARGER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE-HIGH POWER REPRESENTATIVE
24-31-08 BATTERY VENT FAN X MEDIUM VOLTAGE-LOW POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
26-11-07 SMOKE DETECTOR X CASE OPEN, COMPONENTS SEALED
• 30-41-01 WINDSHIELD TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE-HIGH POWER REPRESENTATIVE
32-45-01 ANTI-SKID CONTROL BOX X LOW VOLTAGE-LOW POWER REPRESENTATIVE
32-61-01 PROXIMITY SWITCH CONTROL X LOW VOLTAGE-LOW POWER, REQUIRED, CHECKED AT DISPATCH
33-12-01 MASTER CONTROLLER X LIGHTING CONTROL
TABLE 3-8 (CONT)
DC-9TEST CANDIDATE DETERMINATION
TEST CANDIDATE
CHAPTER COMPONENT YES NO REMARKS
34-18-03 TOTAL AIR TEMPERATURE SENSOR X HIGH POWER HEATING ELEMENT TEMPERATURE PROBE
34-21-05 INSTRUMENT AMPLIFIER RACK X MULTIPLE CHANNELS -- DIFFICULT TO SIMULATE
34-22-03 INSTRUMENT AMPLIFIER X MULTIPLE CHANNELS -- DIFFICULT TO SIMULATE
34-22-04 VE RTICAL GYRO X ESSENTIALLY PROTECTED
34-24-03 FLIGHT DIRECTOR COMPUTER X TYPICAL TRANSISTORIZED ANALOG COMPUTER
34-24-07 FLIGHT DIRECTOR ROLL COMPUTER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
34-24-08 FLIGHT DIRECTOR PITCH COMPUTER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
34-26-02 NAV INSTRUMENT FAI LURE MONITOR X LOW VOLTAGE, HIGH POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
34-2602 NAV SMART RACK X DIFFICULT TO TEST
_o 34-26-03 NAV COMPARATOR UNIT (2 LISTED) X MULTIPLE CHANNELS -- DIFFICULT TO SIMULATE
34-26-04 SPEE D COMMAN D COMPA RATO R X DI F FICU LT TO TEST
34-28-02 RATE-OF-TURN RACK X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
34-29-01 STANDBY HORIZON INDICATOR X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
34-31-01 MARKER BEACON RECEIVER (2 LISTED) X ALSO DC-10 CANDIDATES
34-32-01 VOR/ILS RECEIVER X ALSO DC-10 CANDIDATE
34-33-05 ADF RECEIVER (2 LISTED) X ONE TYPE ALSO A DC-10 CANDIDATE
34-41-02 ATC TRANSPONDE R (2 LISTED) X ONE TYPE ALSO A DC-10 CANDIDATE
34-42-02 DME INTERROGATOR X FORCED COOLING, CHASSIS TYPE CONSTRUCTION
34-43-02 WEATHER RADAR R/T UNIT X DIFFICULT TO TEST
34-43-04 WEATHER RADAR INDICATOR (2 LISTED) X HIGH VOLTAGE, LOW POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
34-44-01 RADIO ALTIMETER R/T UNIT (2 LISTED) X TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION -- FORCED COOLING
34-51-01 GROUND PROXIMITY WARN COMPUTER X MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW POWER, NON-CRITICAL REGIME
SECTION4
FIBERTRANSFERFUNCTIONS
4.1 Introduction
The operating modes of the DC-IO and DC-9 were analyzed with respect to
CF environment and the following modes defined as those during which the air-
craft will be vulnerable to CF ingestion:
I. Main engines supplying bleed air to the air-conditioning packs and
through the cockpit or cabin to the avionics compartments. Air can
be extracted from either low-_ or high-stage bleed port depending on
engine power setting.
2. Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Supplying bleed air to the air-condition-
ing packs.
3. Pneumatic ground cart(s) supplying air to the packs (cockpit windows
and passenger doors may be open or closed).
4. Conditioned air cart(s) supplying air directly to the cockpit and
cabin distribution ducting (windows and passenger doors open or
closed).
5. Open cockpit windows and/or passenger doors open and avionics cool-
ing fan drawing air into avionics compartments.
6. Avionics compartment door(s) open and the avionics cooling fan
drawing air directly into the avionics compartment (conditioned air
may or may not be supplied by packs or carts).
Operating modes 1 and 2 above can occur with the aircraft either static
(parked) or moving during taxi, takeoff, or low-level flight and results given
are applicable to any of these conditions. Operating modes 3, 4, 5 and 6 apply
only to aircraft which are parked.
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The transfer function for the passage of CF through the aircraft defines
the ratio of the weight concentration of CF at a given point within the air-
craft (CI) to the weight concentration of CF in the ambient air outside the
aircraft (Co). This function is dependent both on the aircraft operating mode
and the point within the aircraft under consideration. In order to simplify
the analyses and provide maximumflexibility in the use of results, each oper-
ating mode was analyzed and an overall transfer factor (OTF) was established
for that mode from the relationship:
OTF= (I - nl)(l - n2)(l - n3)
where nI is the CF extraction efficiency of the first element in the flow
paths of the CF-laden air and n2, n3, etc. are successive elements in the flow
path up to the point of interest within the aircraft.
The overall transfer factors may be considered single mode transfer func-
tions and CF concentration during a given operating mode may be determined
from:
CI = Co(OTF)
The following sections develop the extraction efficiencies and overall
transfer factors for all modes of interest which in the the aggregate define
transfer functions for the DC-9 and DC-IO aircraft. A more detailed analysis
is presented in McDonnell Douglas Report MDCJ8320.
4.2 DC-IO Transfer Function
The overall transfer factors for the DC-IO can be calculated from:
OTF = (I - ne)(l - np)(l - nc)
where: ne is extraction efficiency of the air supply source,
np is the extraction efficiency of the air-conditioning packs, and
nc is the filtering effect of cockpit and cabin furnishings.
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This expression applies to the avionics compartment and the center ac-
cessory compartment (CAC) of the DC-IO with extraction efficiences as shown in
Table 4-I. The expression defines the transfer of fibers to the air in the
compartments. The effects of the "black box" enclosures and individual cool-
ing techniques are not included. They are discussed in detail in McDonnell
Douglas Report MDCJ8320. It will be noted that there are some differences in
OTF between the two compartments when no air-conditioning is being supplied.
These differences are caused by variations in the cooling system operation for
these modes. Specifically, the avionics cooling system will draw outside air
into the compartment while the CACsystem will recirculate air within the air-
craft with little or no outside air entering the compartment.
The values of ne for main engines were derived from the results of dirt
ingestion tests conducted with coarse Arizona road dust. The specific values
given are for the P&WAJT9D engine and include the effects of switching bleed
ports and varying power settings. A comparison of bleed port configuration
and service experience with the GE CF6 engine indicates that these values will
also apply to that engine. The value of ne for the APUwas likewise derived
from test data which indicated that the particle removal characteristics of
this engine are negligible.
The values of ne for ground carts were determined by contacts with cart
suppliers and airline users. Both these groups also stated that these units
are used infrequently on the DC-IO because of the availability of the APU.
The values of np were calculated for packs with a water separator bypass
configuration* for both a hot day and a cold day situation to define maximum
and minimum values. Water separator bag filtering efficiency was assumed to
be 0.9 after contact with bag suppliers, and comparison with known filter
media.
The value of nc was calculated from the known settling rate (O.2m/s) of
composite fibers and the airflow velocities through the cockpit and cabin.
Both re-entrainment and crack-capture effects have been ignored due to lack
*This is the configuration of the domestic, short-range DC-IO-IO.
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TABLE 4-1
TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR CF TO THE AVIONICS AND CAC COMPARTMENTS OF THE DC-10
AVIONICS COMPARTMENT CENTER ACCESSORY COMPARTMENT
NO. OPERATING MODE "qe _p 'qc OTF n e 'rtp n c OTF
1 MAIN ENGINES (3)
70 PERCENT TAKEOFF POWER 0,957 HOT DAY 0,898 0.31 0.00136 0.957 HOT DAY 0.898 0.31 0.00136
(8TH STAGE BLEED)
COLD DAY 0.684 0,31 0.00421 COLD DAY 0,684 0.31 0,00421
90 PERCENT TAKEOFF POWER (3) 0,962 0.898 0.31 0.00120 0.962 0.898 0.31 0.00120
(8TH STAGE BLEED)
0.684 0,31 0.00372 0.684 0.31 0,00372
GROUND IDLE (3) 0.9956 0.898 0.31 0.00014 0.9956 0.898 0.31 0.00014
(HIGH STAGE BLEED)
0.684 0.31 0,00043 0.684 0.31 0,00043
2 APU OR (3) 0 0.898 0,31 0.03162 0 0.898 0.31 0,03162
3 PNEUMATIC CART
I_ 0.684 0.31 0.09796 0.684 0.31 0.09796M
4 CONDITIONED AIR (4) 0 0 0.31 0.69000 0 0 0.31 0.69000
CART
5 OPEN COCKPIT 0.31 0.69000 (1)
WINDOWS AND 0 0 0.31 0.69000 0 0
PASSENGER DOORS 1.00 0 (2)
6 OPEN AVlONICS 0 0 0 1.00000 0 0 1.00 0
COMPARTMENT AND CAC DOORS
(1) FOR AIRCRAFT WHICH DRAW AIR FROM CABIN. (3) IF TRANSFER FUNCTION IS DESIRED FOR FIBERS GREATER THAN
(2} FORAIRCRAFTWHICH DRAWAIR FROM UNDER THE CABIN FLOOR. 1MM, THIS VALUE BECOMES 1.0 ANDOTF = 0. SEE BIONETICS
DATA (REFERENCE NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT 159183).
(4) FOR THE SAME CONDITIONS AS NOTE 3. THIS VALUE SHOULD BE
0.50 ANDOTF = 0.35.
of data which would apply to aircraft interiors. It should be noted that
these two factors tend to cancel each other and the effect of ignoring them
may not significantly affect the final answers.
The settling of fibers in both the avionics compartment and the CACwas
considered to be negligible because of high air velocities and turbulence in
these compartments which should cause substantial re-entrainment. The avionics
compartment has a large recirculating fan which draws air from the forward
left side of the compartment and discharges it into various areas of the com-
partment at velocities up to 1400 m/min (4600 fpm). Most aircraft also have
three inertial navigation cooling fans dumping into the compartment at 370
m/min (1224 fpm). These fans are in addition to the fan which draws air
through the compartment.
The CAChas a large fan which draws air from the upper cabin on early
aircraft and from below the cabin floor on later versions. This fan discharges
into the compartment at a velocity of approximately 1140 m/min (3745 fpm). In
addition, when conditioned air is being supplied to the cabin with cabin doors
closed, approximately 57 percent of the conditioned air passes through the CAC
prior to exhausting overboard. It is expected that these air flow mechanisms
will prevent significant settling in these compartments.
4.3 DC-9 Transfer Function
The overall transfer factors for the DC-9 can be calculated from:
OTF = (I - ne)(l - np)(l - nc)(l - ns)
where :
ne is the extraction efficiency of the air supply source,
np is the extraction efficiency of the air-conditioning pack
(which includes a centrifugal cleaner),
nc is the filtering effect of cockpit and cabin furnishings, and
ns is the settling effect in the avionics compartment.
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This expression defines the transfer of the fibers to the air of the DC-9
avionics compartment with extraction efficiencies as shown in Table 4-2. This
approach does not define the effects of "black box" enclosures or the various
cooling methods which are used with these units.
The values of ne given for the P&WAJT8D main engines are judgmental in
nature due to the paucity of usable test data. Although numerous tests have
been conducted, no data was uncovered to relate contamination at the bleed
ports to that at the engine inlet. Values of ne were therefore selected after
careful consideration of pack nozzle erosion experience and a comparison of
bleed air extraction features with those of the DC-IO engines. The values
chosen are intended to represent a "worst case"; i.e., largest possible
amount of CF being left in the bleed air.
From the DC-9 APU, no data applicable to this study was uncovered. It
was therefore assumed that this machine is equivalent to the DC-IO and neither
concentrates nor extracts CF prior to being bled. Likewise, ground carts for
pneumatic air and conditioned air are assumed to have characteristics identical
to those used on the DC-IO.
The value of np includes the effects of the Centrisep bleed air cleaner
and water separator bag filtering as a function of air being bypassed on hot
and cold day situations. Performance of the Centrisep cleaner is well docu-
mented by test data and service experience. Water separator bag filtering
efficiency was again assumed to be 90 percent, based on comparison with other
filter construction.
The value of nc was calculated from the known characteristics of the
DC-9 cockpit and cabin volumes and airflow rates with a CF settling rate of
0.2 m/s. This factor does not include the effects of re-entrainment or
"crack-capture."
The DC-9 avionics compartment should experience some settling of CF
fibers because of relatively low velocities in the compartment. The value of
ns was therefore determined from compartment volume and airflow rates without
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compensation for re-entrainment or "crack-capture." The value of ns repre-
sents the average settling in the compartment; i.e., midway in the compartment
between the air inlet and exit.
4.4 Discussion of Data
4.4.1 Main Engine Data
Test data on the P&WAJT9D provides a high level of confidence in analy-
sis associated with this engine. The uncertainties involve the assumption
that CF density of 1.7 gm/cm3 is sufficiently close to "Arizona Road Dust"
density of 2.4 gm/cm3 so that both mediums will behave in the same manner
while passing through the engine. It was also assumed that CF fibers would
break into relatively short segments analogous to the 5- to 15-micron dust
category when passing through high-speed axial and centrifugal compressors
and fans. This is basically substantiated by the data supplied by Bionetics
on simulated turning vanes.
These data associated with the GE CF6 engine presented some uncertainties
but it is believed that this engine is at least as good as the JT9D in foreign
matter rejection from the bleed ports. The data used for this engine are
therefore conservative.
The values used to the P&WAJT8D are substantiated only by comparison to
the JT9D. Since these two engines are substantially different in size and
construction, this comparison does not provide a high level of confidence in
these numbers.
4.4.2 APUData
Test data on the DC-IO APU had some argumentative aspects but the
results appear to be substantiated by in-service pack nozzle erosion data.
No data was available on the separation efficiency of the DC-9 APU.
However, pack nozzle erosion data tends to support the value chosen.
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4.4.3 Pneumatic and Conditioned Air Carts
Ground cart manufacturers could provide no data other than judgment as to
the filtering to be expected from this equipment. It is expected that pneu-
matic carts would exhibit a wide range of values due to the various designs
used for this task.
4.4.4 Air-Conditioning Packs
The filtering effects of the water separator bags and the centrifugal
bleed air cleaner used in the analysis are the same as those in McDonnell
Douglas Report MDCJ8320, and were based on particulate data of the actual air
cleaner and on comparative data for the water separator. The data supplied by
Bionetics indicate a higher separation efficiency, for both the water separa-
tor and air cleaner, than the values used in this analysis. However, the data
were for CF sizes of I, 3, and I0 mmand it is expected that the CF sizes will
be less than 1 mmbefore reaching the air-conditioning packs. This is substan-
tiated by the Bionetics data on simulated turning vanes which show the carbon
fibers are broken up (<I mm) for air velocities that are present in both the
engines and APUs. Therefore, it is believed that the values obtained in MDC
J8320 are more representative of the actual case.
4.4.5 Settling, Re-entrainment, and Crack Capture
The interior of an aircraft is a complex maze of wire bundles, cables,
structures, equipment racks, seats, carpeting, avionics units, ducts instru-
mentation, etc., with many airflow origination points and flow paths coupled
with the effects of humanmovements. In addition, settling, re-entrainment,
and crack capture will be affected by the length of the carbon fibers. As
previously stated, CF passing through high-speed rotary equipment is assumed
to be "chopped" while CF passing into avionics areas through open windows and
doors will be as initially disseminated.
Since there were no data applicable to this type of construction and
environment, the approach used in defining settling, re-entrainment, and crack
capture effects was to establish a "worst case" for the combination of the
three factors. The actual condition to be encountered on an aircraft may be
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somewhat better than the values used, but a significant change in values is
not expected because the effects of settling and crack capture are opposed by
re-entrainment.
4.4.6 Data Summary
The various operating conditions (I through 6 of Tables 4-I and 4-2)
were sufficient to determine the transfer functions for all operating condi-
tions to be considered. However, the data are reorganized into Tables 4-3,
4-4, and 4-5 to better present the functions considered in the other sections
of this report.
27
TABLE 4-2
TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR CF TO THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT OF THE DC-9
NO. OPERATING MODE n e _p nc ns OTF
1 MAIN ENGINES
8TH STAGE (1) --1,5 HOT DAY 0.987 0.454 0.293 0.01255
COLD DAY 0.664 0.454 0.293 0.32425
13TH STAGE (1) 0.5 0.987 0.454 0.293 0.00251
0.664 0.454 0.293 0.06485
2 APU OR PNEUMATIC (1) 0 0.987 0.454 0.293 0.00502
3 GROUND CART 0.664 0.454 0.293 0.12970
4 CONDITIONED AIR CART (2) 0 0 0.454 0°293 0.38602
co
5 OPEN COCKPIT WINDOWS AND 0 0 0.454 0.293 0.38602
PASSENGER DOORS
6 OPEN AVIONICS 0 0 0 0.293 0.70700
COMPARTMENT DOOR
(1) IF TRANSFER FUNCTION IS DESIRED FOR FIBERS GREATER THAN 1 MM IN LENGTHpTHIS VALUE BECOMES 1.0 AND
OTF = 0.0. SEEBIONETICS DATA (REFERENCE NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT 159183).
(2) FOR THE SAME CONDITIONS AS NOTE (1),THIS VALUE SHOULD BE0.5ANOOTF = 0.19.
TABLE 4-3
DC-10 AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
OVERALL TRANSFER FUNCTION
AVIONICS DOOR AVIONICS DOOR
OPEN CLOSED
AIRCRAFT POWER PASSENGER DOORS PASSENGER DOORS
OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED
HOT COLD HOT COLD= ROT COLD ROT COLD
ENGINE 70 PERCENT TAKEOFF 1 1 0.00136 0.00421 0.00136 0.00421 0.00136 0.00421
(8TH STAGE BLEED)
90 PERCENT TAKEOFF 1 1 0,00120 0,00372 0.00120 0.00372 0,00120 0.00372
(8TH STAGE BLEED)
I_ GROUND iDLE 1 1 0.00014 0.00043 0,00014 0,00043 0.00014 0.00043
(HIGH STAGE BLEED)
APU OR PNEUMATIC CART 1 1 0.03162 0,09796 0.03162 0,09796 0.03162 0,09796
AIR CONDITIONING CART 1 1 0.69000 0,69000 0.69000 0.69000 0.69000 0,69000
GROUND ELECTRIC 1 1 1 1 0.69000 0.69000 0 0
NONE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE 4-4
DC-10 CENTER ACCESSORYCOMPARTMENT
OVERALL TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
CENTER ACCESS DOOR CENTER ACCESS DOOR
OPEN CLOSED
AIRCRAFT POWER PASSENGER DOORS PASSENGER DOORS
OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED
HOT COLD HOT COLD HOT COLD HOT COLD
ENGINE 70 PERCENT TAKEOFF (1) 0.69000 (1) 0.69000 0.00136 0.00421 0,00136 0.00421 0.00136 0.00421
(8TH STAGE BLEED) (2) 0 (2) 0
90 PERCENT TAKEOFF 0.69000 0.69000 0.00120 0.00372 0.00120 0.00372 0.00120 0.00372
(8TH STAGE BLEED) 0 0
GROUND IDLE 0.69000 0.69000 0.00014 0,00043 0.00014 0.00043 0.00014 0,00043
(HIGH STAGE BLEED) 0 0O
APU OR PNEUMATIC CART 0,69000 0.69000 0.03162 0.09796 0.03162 0,09796 0.03162 0.09796
0 0
AIR CONDITIONING CART 0.69000 0,69000 0,69000 0.69000 0.69000 0.69000 0.69000 0.69000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GROUND ELECTRIC 0.69000 0.69000 0 0 0.69000 0.69000 0 0
0 0 0 0
NONE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
(1) AIRPLANES PRIOR TO 242 THAT DRAWAIR FORTHE CACFAN FROM THE CABIN
(2) AI RPLANES 242 AND SUBS THAT DRAWAIRFORTHECAS FAN FROM THE SIDE TUNNELS
TABLE 4-5
DC-9 AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
OVERALL TRANSFER FUNCTION
AVIONICS DOOR AVIONICS DOOR
OPEN CLOSED
o
AIRCRAFT POWER PASSENGER DOORS PASSENGER DOORSi i
OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED
HOT COLD HOT COLD HOT COLD HOT COLD
ENGINE 8TH STAGE 0.70700 0.70700 0.01255 0.32425 O.01255 0.32425 0.01255 0.32425
13TH STAGE 0.70700 0,70700 0.00251 0.06485 0,00251 0.06485 0.00251 0.06485
APU OR PNEUMATIC CART 0.70700 0.70700 0.00502 0.12970 0.00502 0.12970 0.00502 0.12970
(,4
AIR CONDITIONING CART 0,70700 0.70700 0,38602 0.38602 0.38602 0.38602 0.38602 0.38602
GROUND ELECTRIC 0.70700 0.70700 0.70700 0.70700 0.38602 0.38602 0 0
NONE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECTION5
TRANSPORTAIRCRAFTE_UIPMENTPOTENTIALFOREXPOSURETO CARBONFIBERS
5.1 Introduction
NASA-Langley _s assessing the national risk caused by the release of
carbon fibers (CF) following accidental fires on aircraft utilizing graphite
epoxy composite structural materials. This activity includes contracts to
estimate the damage cost of CF exposures at specific sites. NASAalso has
contracts with the three major domestic airframe manufacturers to evaluate
the equipment failures in commercial aircraft exposed to CF releases. The
expected number of aircraft in potentially vulnerable operating modes in the
vicinity of an accidental CF release incident is required for this evaluation.
This report presents the aircraft manufacturers' consolidated estimate of that
required data for nine domestic airports.
5.1.1 Inputs to Risk Analysis Models
The risk analysis models to estimate the damage cost of a CF fire are to
be used at the following airports:
Chicago O'Hare (ORD)
New York City Kennedy (JFK)
St. Louis Lambert (STL)
New York City LaGuardia (LGA)
Boston Logan (BOS)
Philadelphia International (PHL)
Washington, D.C. National (DCA)
Atlanta Hartsfield (ATL)
Miami International (MIA)
It has been determined that aircraft in flight and aircraft on the ground
with all doors closed, operating with no power on or on normal engine power,
have an effective transfer function of zero to equipment locations, and need
not receive further consideration in the risk analysis. Therefore, major
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input to these models is the expected number of aircraft on the ground in
other operating modes at each of these airports; this input is to be specified
according to:
Time of day:
• Daytime (0600-2059)
• Nightime (2100-0559)
Aircraft type (only jet aircraft considered)
• Large (over 250 seats)
m Medium (150 to 250 seats)
m Small (under 150 seats)
Location on the airport:
• At gate being serviced
• At maintenance facility (being serviced or parked)
The probability that a CF cloud will short aircraft electronic equipment
is dependent upon the transfer function to the various equipment locations,
characterized by the following door status and the aircraft power sources.
Avionic doors:
• open
• closed
Passenger and/or cargo doors:
• open
• closed
Power Source:
• Auxiliary power unit
• Engines running
• Air cart
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• Ground electrical
• No power
5.1.2 Aircraft Operations on the Airport
There are three basic locations atan airport where an aircraft is parked
with its avionic, passenger, or cargo doors open. These are: passenger
terminal, cargo terminal, and maintenance facility. The passenger and all
cargo aircraft are analyzed separately, but the results are combined to give
the total number of aircraft being serviced at the gate.
An aircraft is being serviced at a gate if it is:
• Being prepared for a flight origin
• Being serviced during an en route stop
• Being serviced after a flight termination
An aircraft has an en route stop if its departure flight number is the
sameas its arrival flight number. Most flight terminations will stay at the
gate and becomeflight origins; however, manywill be towed to a maintenance
facility for scheduled work.
An en route stop usually requires less time than a turn (flight destina-
tion plus flight origination) because fewer services (particularly cabin
cleaning) are performed. Other factors which significantly impact time at
the gate include:
• Galley service
• Customs clearance on international flights
• Ground crew availability
• Buffer time to allow for airport delays
The gate times for scheduled service include time for maintenance tasks
normally performed during en route and turn operations and for minor problems
that keep the aircraft at the gate for a longer time period than planned. In
addition, there are often aircraft at the gate during nighttime hours for
scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. This includes the extensive overnight
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cabin cleaning which often requires more than two hours. The aircraft being
maintained at the gate during nighttime hours is added to nighttime scheduled
service to give the total number of aircraft at the gate. It is assumed that
there is no maintenance performed at the gate during the day.
The average number of aircraft at the separate maintenance facility
during the daytime and during nighttime has been determined for each airport
based upon data from the airlines, airport authorities, and aircraft manufac-
turers' field representatives. These data are used directly to define the
number of aircraft in the maintenance facility.
5.2 Data
5.2.1 Gate Times
Gate time data was obtained from the following airlines: United, Ameri-
can, Ozark, Western, Continental, Delta and Trans World. These data ranged
from actual scheduled gate times, to planning guidelines, to discussions of
how gate time is impacted by customs, cabin cleaning, or food service. The
airline data defined the operations as turns or en route stops.
Table 5-I presents the average scheduled gate time as a function of air-
craft type and type of operation. Gate times for supersonic and two-engine
narrow-body aircraft were estimated without any airline data. Gate times for
international passenger and all cargo flights were assumed to be five minutes
longer than domestic turns.
TABLE 5-I
AVERAGE SCHEDULED GATE TIMES (MINUTES)
INTERNATIONAL
PASSENGER
TYPE FLIGHT DOMESTIC PASSENGER OR FREIGHT
TYPE SERVICE EN ROUTE TURN TURN
TYPE OPERATION ARRIVAL DEPART ARRIVAL DEPART ARRIVAL DEPART
SUPERSONIC .... 60 MIN 75MIN
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 23 MIN 38 MIN 37 MIN 53 MIN 52 68
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 22 31 35 48 50 63
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 21 30 35 47 50 62
4 ENGINE NARROW 21 29 35 45 50 60
3 ENGINE NARROW 20 24 33 39 48 56
2 ENGINE NARROW 19 21 32 37 47 52
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5.2.2 Number of Operations
Data on the number of aircraft operations was obtained from the August
1978 Official Airline Guide (OAG) computer tape. These data were extracted
to give the number of operations for all combinations of the following:
Airport: each of the nine airports
Time of day:
• Daytime (0600-2059 hours)
• Nighttime (2100-0559 hours)
Aircraft type:
• Supersonic (only at JFK)
• 4-Engine Wide-Body (B747)
• 3-Engine Wide-Body (DC-IO, L-IOll)
e 2-Engine Wide-Body (A300)
• 4-Engine Narrow-Body (DC-8, B707)
• 3-Engine Narrow-Body (B727)
• 2-Engine Narrow-Body (DC-9, B737, BACI-II)
Type of flight:
• Passenger Aircraft
• Domestic (to or from U.S. airport)
• International
• All Cargo Aircraft
Type of operation:
• Arrival
• Departure
All four- and three-engine wide-body aircraft are classified as large
aircraft (over 250 seats). The two-engine wide-body aircraft and 36.4 percent
of the four-engine narrow-body aircraft are classified as medium aircraft
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(150 to 250 seats). All other aircraft are classified as small aircraft (under
150 seats). In August 1978, there were 717 daily departures by four-engine
narrow-body aircraft with over 150 seats and 1254 daily departures by four-
engine narrow-body aircraft with less than 150 seats; hence, 36.4 percent of
the four-engine narrow-body aircraft are medium-sized.
The OAGdata give the number of arrivals and departures per hour for
domestic passenger flights, international passenger flights, and all cargo
flights. The data extracted did not identify whether the flight was a turn
or en route stop. It was assumed that: JFK, MIA and BOShave 90-percent
turns, ORD, DCA, ATL and LGA have 60-percent turns, STL and PHL have 20-percent
turns. It was also assumed that an additional two minutes per operation was
scheduled for ORDand LGA to give an additional buffer time for airport runway
delays.
5.2.3 Aircraft at Maintenance Facility and Overnight Aircraft
The average number of aircraft at the maintenance facility during the
daytime and nighttime was obtained from the airlines, airport authorities,
and aircraft manufacturers' representatives.
The average number of aircraft which overnight at the gate is used to
compute the expected number of exposed aircraft at the gate during nighttime.
These numbers are calculated from the total number of aircraft which overnight
at the airport and the number of aircraft in the maintenance facility during
the daytime and nighttime. The total number of aircraft which overnight are
obtained from an analysis of the OAGdata and contacts with airlines, airport
authorities, and aircraft manufacturers' field representatives.
Data on the number of aircraft at the maintenance facility during the
daytime and nighttime and the total number of overnight aircraft were obtained
by a coordinated effort of the three aircraft manufacturers. Each manufacturer
obtained these data for three airports:
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Douglas Aircraft Company
Chicago O'Hare (ORD)
New York City Kennedy (JFK)
St. Louis Lambert (STL)
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
New York City LaGuardia (LGA)
Boston Logan (BOS)
Philadelphia International (PHL)
Lockheed-California Company
Washington, D.C. National (DCA)
Atlanta Hartsfield (ATL)
Miami International (MIA)
5.2.4 Operating Modes
The probability that a CF cloud will damage aircraft electronic equipment
is dependent upon the aircraft's power source and whether the passenger or
avionic bay door is open. The aircraft power source and door status (or
operating mode) was determined by interviewing airline maintenance and opera-
tions personnel, and by on-site surveys to determine the percent of the air-
craft in each operating mode.
The percent of the time the aircraft spent in each operating mode was
determined by Boeing and Lockheed for the following conditions:
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
e Gate position daytime
• Gate position nighttime
Lockheed-California Company
• Maintenance facility
The operating mode data are summarized in Table 5-2.
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TABLE 5-2
PERCENT OF TIME PER OPERATING MODE
AVIONIC DOORS
AIRPORT OPEN CLOSED
LOCATION AIRCRAFT PASSENGER DOORS PASSENGER DOORS
AND TIME POWER
PERIOD SOURCE OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED
GATE, DAY AUXILIARY POWER UNIT 1 0 95 0
ENGINES 0 0 0 0
AIR CART 0 0 0 0
GROUND ELECTRIC 0 0 4 0
NONE 0 0 0 PARK
GATE, NIGHT AUXILIARY POWER UNIT 0 0 18 0
ENGINES 0 0 2 0
AIR CART 0 0 0 0
GROUND ELECTRIC 30 0 50 0
NONE 0 0 0 PARK
MAINTENANCE AUXILIARY POWER UNIT 3,3 0.5 1,0 0.5
ENGINES 1.0 0 0 1.0
AIR CART 1,0 0 0 0
GROUND ELECTRIC 72,7 0 13.8 0
NONE 1.9 0 3.3 PARK
4O
5.2.5 Transfer Functions
Boeing and Lockheed determined the transfer functions presented in
Table 5-3, Boeing developed the transfer functions for small aircraft, and
Lockheed developed the transfer functions for medium and large aircraft. All
three manufacturers have reviewed these data and have agreed that they
adequately characterize their fleets.
Table 5-4 presents the potential exposure factors for the aircraft sizes,
equipment location on the aircraft, and aircraft location on the airport.
These potential exposure factors were obtained by multiplying the fraction of
the time per operating mode by the transfer function for that operating mode
and then summing for all operating modes.
5.3 Analysis
5.3.1 Expected Number of Aircraft at the Gate
The expected number of aircraft at the gate is equal to the number in
active service (being prepared for a flight origin, during an en route stop,
or after a flight destination) plus the number of aircraft receiving extensive
maintenance or cabin cleaning at the gate (this only occurs during nighttime).
Table 5-5 (one page per aircraft) contains the data and basic calculations to
determine the expected number of aircraft at the gate.
The top part of Tables 5-5 through 5-13 presents the OAGdata and the
calculated gate hours. The OAGdata gives the total daily (average day in
August 1978) scheduled operations for all combinations of:
• Time period (daytime, nighttime)
• Type of operation (arrival, departure)
o Type of flight (domestic passenger, international passenger or freight)
• Aircraft type (seven types)
The gate hours per aircraft type and time period are obtained by multiply-
ing the number of operations by the gate time per operation (Table 5-I) and
summing for all types of operations.
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TABLE 5-3
TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
AVIONIC DOORS
OPEN CLOSED
AIRCRAFT ELECTRON IC AIRCRAFT
PASSENGER DOORS PASSENGER DOORSSIZE EQUIPMENT POWER
CLASS LOCATION SOURCE OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED
SMALL AVIONICS BAY APU 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0025
ENG 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.000004
AI R 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
GR EL 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7
NONE 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0
FLIGHT DECK APU 0.7 0.0025 0,7 0.0025
EN G 0.7 0.0025 0.7 0,000004
AI R 0.7 0,7 0.7 0.7
G R EL 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
NONE 0,7 0.0025 0,7 0.0
MED/LARGE FLIGHT STATION APU 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.005
E NG 0.01 0.0008 0.01 0.0008
A IR 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.005
GR EL 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0
NONE 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0
PASSENGER CABIN APU 0.01 0.0025 0.01 0.0025
ENG 0.01 0,0004 0,01 0.0004
AI R 0.01 0.0025 0.01 0.0025
GR EL 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0
NONE 0,01 0.0 O.O1 0.O
FESC/MESC APU 1.0 1.0 0,0025 0.0025
ENG 1.0 1,0 0.0004 0.0004
At R 1.0 1.0 0.0025 0.0025
GR EL 1.0 1.0 0.01 0.0
NONE 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
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TABLE 5-4
POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FACTOR
(FRACTION OF TIME) (TRANSFER FUNCTION)
OPERATING
MODES
AIRPORT LOCATION AND
TIME PERIOD
ELECTRONIC
AI RCRAFT EQUIPMENT GATE GATE
SIZE LOCATION DAYTIME NIGHTTIME MAINTENANCE
SMALL AVIONICS BAY 0,703 0,79 0.9277
FLIGHT DECK 0,7 0.7 0.6860
MED/LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0.01 0.01 0.0098
PASSENG ER CABI N 0.01 0.01 0.0098
FESC/M ESC 0.0128 0,3055 0.7984
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TABLE 5-5
CHICAGO O'HARE (ORD)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE - AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F O I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 9.3 9.1 12.3 9.6 33.3 5.0 3.9 2.0 2.6 10.5
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 89.0 3.6 92.3 3.7 114.5 17.0 0.1 13.7 0 17.9
_. 2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
4 ENGINE NARROW 65.3 21.7 66.2 23.4 116.0 8.0 15.3 6.8 14.6 35.6
3 ENGINE NARROW 352.1 11.1 347.8 11.1 373.6 34,5 4.4 42,6 1.4 44,2
2 ENGINE NARROW 177,0 2.0 177.8 2.0 172.9 17.9 2.0 21.2 2.0 20.1
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACI LITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY NIGHT TOTAL ACTIVE
SMALL 34 9 19 24 8.0
MEDIUM 1 0 1 0 0.0
LARGE 6 2 5 3 1.3
TABLE 5-6
NEW YORK CITY KENNEDY (JFK)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE -- AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A ' D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC -- 2,4 -- 2.4 5.4 .....
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 11,3 46,5 13.1 40,4 103,9 4.0 5,8 2.0 12,6 23.4
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 21.5 11,3 21.3 11.7 51.0 6.9 4.4 7.1 4.0 17.5
4_
o'1
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 3.0 -- 5.0 -- 5.4 2.0 -- -- -- 1,1
4 ENGINE NARROW 32.3 58.8 34.0 49.2 141.6 9,4 9.5 6.7 18.8 37.0
3 ENGINE NARROW 51.3 9,0 54.3 9,9 76.9 11.1 1,6 9.1 0,7 13.4
2 ENGINE NARROW 24,0 10.9 21,9 11.9 43.8 4,7 2.0 6.8 1.0 8.8
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO, OF AVERAGE NO, OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACILITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT DAY NIGHT TOTAL ACTIVE
SMALL 20 8 18 10 3.3
MEDIUM 5 0 5 0 0
LARGE 9 2 8 3 1,3
TABLE 5-7
ST. LOUIS LAMBERT (STL)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE - AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 9.0 -- 10.0 -- 9.7 4.0 -- 3.0 -- 3.5
O_ 2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
4 ENGINE NARROW 23.9 0°7 24.9 1.4 25.6 3,0 1.4 1.0 0.7 3.7
3 ENGINE NARROW 89,7 0.4 104.6 0,4 84.8 10,9 -- 7,0 -- 7.6
2 ENGINE NARROW 94,3 -- 98,9 -- 78.5 13o6 -- 9.0 -- 9.1
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACILITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY NIGHT TOTAL ACTIVE
SMALL 14 2 4 12 4.0
MEDIUM 0 0 0 0 0
LARGE 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE 5-8
NEW YORK CITY LAGUARDIA (LGA)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE - AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 9.9 1.0 8.9 1.0 12.9 1.0 -- 2.0 -- 1.9
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
4 ENGINE NARROW ..........
3 ENGINE NARROW 167.6 10.7 164.7 11.7 188,5 21.7 0.9 12.4 0.9 18.4
2 ENGINE NARROW 85.6 -- 94.8 -- 86.5 16.1 -- 5.9 -- 10.2
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACILITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY NIG HT TOTA L ACTIVE
SMALL 50 0.1 20 30.1 10.0
MEDIUM 1 0 1 0 0
LARGE 2 0 0 2 0.9
TABLE 5-9
BOSTON LOGAN (BOS)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE - AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 2,7 5.0 2,7 2,5 10.1 -- 0.1 -- 1.9 2.2
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 12,4 3.4 14.4 3.4 24,9 5.0 1.0 3.0 1,0 9,6
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
4 ENGINE NARROW 16.6 9,4 20,6 5,3 37.8 4.0 1.6 -- 5.5 9.1
3 ENGINE NARROW 85.8 5.9 98.6 5.9 115.9 20.8 -- 7.0 -- 15.2
2 ENGINE NARROW 59.9 6,0 67.4 6,7 84,2 11.2 1.0 2.9 -- 8.5
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACILITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY NIGHT TOTAL ACTIVE
SMALL 51 2.2 13 40.2 13,4
MEDIUM 0 0 0 0 0
LARGE 3 0 1 2 0,9
TABLE 5-10
PHILADELPHIA (PHL)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE - AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100--0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D IoF
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 2.7 -- 2.7 -- 3,1 .....
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 17.7 1,0 17.7 1,0 19.9 5,0 -- 6,0 -- 5,7
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
_D
4 ENGINE NARROW 16.1 2,0 18.1 2.7 21.0 3.9 0.7 3,0 -- 3.9
3 ENGINE NARROW 56.4 1.3 61,4 2.3 54.0 15,6 1.0 9.6 1,0 12.4
2 ENGINE NARROW 66,3 1.0 72.0 -- 57.0 6.6 1.0 3.9 -- 5.0
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACILITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY NIGHT TOTAL ACTIVE
SM A LL 22 0,2 0 22,2 7,4
MEDIUM 0 0 0 0 0
LARGE 3 0 0 3 1.3
TABLE 5-11
WASHINGTON NATIONAL (DCA)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE -AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
O1O
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY ..........
4 ENGINE NARROW ..........
3 ENGINE NARROW 155.2 -- 153.0 -- 156.0 16.9 - 19.1 -- 18.3
2 ENGINE NARROW 82.0 -- 83=7 -- 79.3 8.3 -- 5.6 -- 6.6
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACI LITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY N IGHT TOTA L ACT IV E
SMALL 27 0 0 27 9.0
MEDIUM 0 0 0 0 0
LARG E 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE 5-12
ATLANTA HARTSFIELD (ATL)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE - AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 0.1 -- 0.1 -- 0.1 0.1 -- -- -- 0.1
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 43.7 2.0 49.7 2.0 59.6 17.0 1.0 11.0 1.0 17.8
O1
.,.I,
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 2.0 -- 2.0 -- 2.6 .....
4 ENGINE NARROW 23.4 5.2 26.6 4.2 37.1 5.9 2.3 4.0 3.3 10.7
3 ENGINE NARROW 204.2 2.3 226.5 2.3 223.1 64.4 -- 41.9 -- 52.9
2 ENGINE NARROW 217.6 -- 229.4 -- 214.0 52.7 -- 38.7 -- 43.2
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACILITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY NIG HT TOTAL ACTIV E
SMALL 24 10 16 18 6.0
MEDIUM 3 1 1 3 1.3
LARGE 6 2 3 5 2.2
TABLE 5-13
MIAMI INTERNATIONAL (MIA)
AIRCRAFT IN SCHEDULED SERVICE - AUGUST 1978
HOURS DAYTIME 0600-2059 NIGHTTIME 2100-0559
STATISTIC SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS GATE
HOURS HOURS
ARRIVALS OR
DEPARTURES A D A D
DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL D I, F D I, F D I, F D I, F
PLUS FREIGHT
SUPERSONIC ..........
4 ENGINE WIDE-BODY -- 2.6 0.1 2.6 5.3 -- 0,6 -- 0.4 1.0
3 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 20.1 11.9 27.0 11.8 55.2 7.0 1.0 1.1 0.1 6.0
olM
2 ENGINE WIDE-BODY 2.0 2.9 2.0 3.0 8.2 1.0 0.1 1.0 -- 1.4
4 ENGINE NARROW 4.8 25.5 8.7 17,1 47.5 3.9 2,5 -- 11.5 15,8
3 ENGINE NARROW 95.2 17.4 112.8 14.3 147.0 38.4 2,3 20.8 5,7 40.1
2 ENGINE NARROW 42.4 26.1 51.6 25.0 93.7 13,5 2.9 2.7 3,5 13.7
AIRCRAFT IN MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT NO. OF AVERAGE NO. OF AIRCRAFT AVERAGE NO. OF OVERNIGHT
SIZE OVERNIGHT AT MAINTENANCE FACILITY AIRCRAFT AT GATE
AIRCRAFT
DAY NIGHT TOTAL ACTIVE
SMALL 54 4 8 50 16.7
MEDIUM 4 0 2 2 0.9
LARGE 7 3 6 4 1.8
The bottom part of Tables 5-5 through 5-13 presents the data on the
average number of aircraft which overnight at the airport and the average
number of aircraft at the maintenance facility during the daytime or nighttime.
The average number of aircraft being maintained at the gate during nighttime
is based upon the following:
I. The number of aircraft at the gate during nighttime equals the
number of aircraft which overnight at the airport minus the differ-
ence in the (nighttime and daytime) number of aircraft at the air-
port's maintenance facility.
2. Aircraft at the gate during nighttime have the doors open and/or
power on for the following number of hours between 9:00 pm and
6:00 am:
Small aircraft - 3 hours
Medium aircraft - 4 hours
Large aircraft - 4 hours
5.3.2 Average Number of Aircraft per Airport
Table 5-14 summarizes the average number of aircraft per airport. The
number of aircraft in maintenance are taken directly from the data at the
bottom of Tables 5-6 through 5-13. The number of aircraft at the gate during
daytime is based upon the daytime gate hours per aircraft type at the top of
those tables. The number of aircraft at the gate during nighttime is based
upon the nighttime gate hours per aircraft type at the top of Tables 5-6
through 5-13, plus the average number of active overnight aircraft at the gate
from the bottom of those tables. The number of aircraft at DCA, ATL, and MIA
are from analysis performed by Lockheed based on the March 1979 scheduled
operations. This method estimates 8.5 percent more total aircraft at these
three airports than would be calculated from the data in Tables 5-6 through
5-13.
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TABLE 5-14
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT PER AIRPORT
DAYTIME NIGHTTIME
AIRPORT AIRCRAFT
SIZE GATE MA!NT GATE MAINT
O RD SMA LL 41.4 9.0 17.7 19.0
MEDIUM 208 0 1.4 1.0
LARGE 9.8 2.0 4.5 5.0
JFK SMALL 40.7 8.0 8.4 18.0
MEDIUM 3.8 0 1.6 5,0
LARGE 10.3 2,0 5.8 8,0
STL SMA LL 17,2 2.0 6.1 4.0
MEDIUM 0.6 0 0.1 0
LARGE 0,6 0 0.4 0
LGA SMALL 18,3 0,1 13.2 20,0
MEDIUM 0 0 0 1.0
LARGE 0,8 0 1.1 0
BOS SMA LL 14.9 2.2 16.7 13,0
MEDIUM 0,9 0 0.3 0
LARGE 2,3 0 1.3 1,0
PH L SMALL 8.3 0.2 9,6 0
MEDIUM 0,5 0 0.1 0
LARG E 1.5 0 1.9 0
DCA SMALL 16,1 0 9.9 0
ATL SMALL 3007 10,0 25,5 16,0
MEDIUM 2,5 1.0 1.7 1.0
LARGE 4.1 2,0 3.9 3,0
MIA SMALL 19.0 4.0 2907 8.0
MEDIUM 2,6 0 3,3 2.0
LARGE 5,9 3.0 5.1 6,0
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5.3.3 Potential Exposure per Airport
Table 5-15 summarizes the potential exposure for
e nine airports
• three aircraft size classes
• two (on small aircraf t ) or three (on medium and large aircraft)
locations of the electronic equipment in the aircraft
• two time periods, and the daily average
The Table 5-15 data are the expected number of aircraft per airport
(Table 5-14) times the potential exposure factor (Table 5-4) and summedfor
aircraft at the gate and at maintenance. The daily average potential exposure
is weighted according to the length of the daytime and nighttime periods.
5.4 Future Changes in Aircraft Operations
It is expected that the following changes will occur before the end of
the century:
I. There will be a small annual increase in aircraft operations. The
magnitude of the increase is airport-dependent. The airports are
sequenced as follows from the largest to the smallest expected
increase: STL, MIA, PHL, ATL, BOS, JFK, ORD, LGAand DCA.
2. There will be a significant shift in aircraft power source from the
auxiliary power unit (APU) to ground electrical power.
3. The 1978 aircraft mix at the nine airports by size category is
approximately:
80 percent small (under 150 seats)
5 percent medium (150-250 seats)
15 percent large (over 250 seats)
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TABLE 5-15
POTENTIAL EXPOSURE PER AIRPORT
(EXPECTED NO, OF AIRCRAFT)(POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FACTOR)
TIME PERIODELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
AIRPORT AIRCRAFT SIZE LOCATION DAYTIME NIGHTTIME AVERAGE
ORD SMALL AVION ICS BAY 50.45 31.61 43.39
FLIGHT DECK 35,15 25.42 31.50
MEDIUM FLIGHT STATION 0.03 0.02 0,03
PASSENGER CABIN 0,03 0.02 0,03
FESC/MESC 0.04 0,82 0.33
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0.12 0,09 0,11
PASSENGER CABI N 0.12 0,09 0,11
FESC/M ESC 1,72 4,05 2,59
JFK SMALL AVIONICS BAY 36.03 22,60 30,99
FLIGHT DECK 33,98 18.23 28,07
MEDIUM FLIGHT STATION 0,04 0,06 0,05
PASSENGER CABIN 0,04 0.06 0.05
FESC/MESC 0,05 4,01 1.54
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0,12 0.14 0.13
PASSENGER CABIN 0,12 0.14 0,13
FESC/MESC 1,73 8,16 4,14
STL SMALL AVI ON ICS BAY 13,95 8,53 11,92
F LIGHT DECK 13,41 7.01 11,01
MEDIUM FLIGHT STATION 0,01 0.00 0.00
PASSENGER CABIN 0,01 0,00 0,00
F ESC/M ESC O.01 O.O3 0.O2
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0.01 0,00 0.01
PASSENGER CABI IV 0.01 0.00 0,01
FESC/MESC 0,01 0,12 0.05
LGA SMALL AVIONICS BAY 12.96 28.98 18.97
F LIGHT DECK 12.88 22.96 16.66
MEDIUM FLIGHT STATION 0.00 0.01 0,00
PASSENGER CABIN 0.00 0.01 0.00
F ESC/M ESC 0.00 0.80 0.30
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0o01 0.01 0.01
PASSENGER CABIN 0.01 0.01 0.01
FESC/MESC 0.01 0.34 0.13
56
TABLE 5-15 (CONT)
POTENTIAL EXPOSURE PER AIRPORT
(EXPECTED NO. OF AIRCRAFT)(POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FACTOR)
TIME PERIOD
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
AIRPORT AIRCRAFT SIZE LOCATION DAYTIME NIGHTTIME AVERAGE
BOS SMA LL AVl ON ICS BAY 12.52 25,25 17.29
FLIGHT DECK 11.94 20.61 15.19
MEDIUM FLIGHT STATION 0.01 0,00 0.01
PASSENGER CABIN 0.01 0.00 0,01
FESC/M ESC 0.01 0.09 0,04
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0,02 0,02 0.02
PASSENGER CABIN 0,02 0.02 0.02
FESC/M ESC 0,03 1,20 0,47
PHL SMALL AVIONICS BAY 6.02 7,58 6.61
FLIGHT DECK 5.95 6.72 6.24
MEDIUM FLIGHT STATION 0.01 0.00 0.00
PASSENG ER CARl N 0.01 0.00 0.00
FESC/MESC 0,01 0,03 0,02
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0,02 0,02 0,02
PASSENGER CARl N 0,02 0.02 0,02
FESC/MESC 0,02 0,58 0,23
DCA SMALL AVIONICS BAY 11,32 7.82 10,01
FLIGHT DECK 11,27 6,93 9,64
ATL SMALL AVION ICS BAY 30.86 34.99 32.41
FLIGHT DECK 28.35 28.83 28,53
M EDI UM F LI GHT STATIO N 0,03 0.03 0.03
PASSENGER CABIN 0.03 0.03 0,03
FESC/MESC 0,83 1,32 1.01
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0,06 0.07 0,06
PASSENGER CABIN 0,06 0.07 0,06
FESC/MESC 1.65 3.59 1,45
MIA SMALL AVIONICS BAY 17,07 30,88 22,25
FLIGHT DECK 16o04 26,28 19,88
MEDIUM FLIGHT STATION 0.03 0.05 0,04
PASSENGER CABIN 0.03 0.05 0.04
FESC/M ESC 0.03 2.60 1.00
LARGE FLIGHT STATION 0.09 0.11 0,10
PASSENGER CABIN 0.09 0.11 0.10
FESC/M ESC 2,47 6.35 3.92
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There will be a significant decrease in the percent that are small air-
craft, and the medium-sized aircraft will receive most of the growth,
5.5 Summary
Table 5-15 illustrates that the potential exposure per airport is not
large, and that the potential exposure is predominantly to small aircraft.
The small aircraft have the largest potential exposure because they constitute
approximately eighty percent of all aircraft and because they have a signifi-
cantly higher transfer function than medium/large aircraft. Table 5-4 shows
that the potential exposure factor for small aircraft is approximately 70
times the potential exposure factor for the flight station and passenger cabin
of medium or large aircraft, or for the forward or middle electronics service
center of aircraft at the gate during daytime.
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SECTION6
EQUIPMENTVULNERABILITYASSESSMENT
An investigation into electrical components potentially vulnerable to
carbon fiber (CF) contamination was conducted for the DC-9 and DC-IO aircraft.
These components, otherwise known as line replaceable units (LRUs) or black
boxes (shortened to just "boxes"), have been categorized by type of design
and vulnerability in accordance with NASAcriteria.
Vulnerability to CF contamination in electrical/electronic equipment is
determined by the type of equipment. For cooling purposes, some equipment is
designed to be open so that air can flow through and vent the heat that is
generated as the equipment is operated. Small carbon fibers released into the
air may gain access to this type equipment with a probability of settling
across unprotected terminals or uncoated terminal board leads, causing the
equipment to malfunction.
Risk assessment is made by studying present-day aircraft safety and the
cost of maintaining the vulnerable aircraft equipment under today's circum-
stances, and by comparing to corresponding future cost and safety when the
use of composite materials becomes more widespread.
Tables 6-I through 6-6 list the vulnerable LRUs for the DC-IO and DC-9
aircraft, respectively. These lists were categorized into open electrical/
electronic boxes having:
Cagegory
A Coated boards and unprotected terminals
B Uncoated boards and protected terminals
C Uncoated boards and unprotected terminals
The LRUsare further classified as to use:
Classification
D Required for dispatch
E Passenger convenience
F Crew convenience (autopilot, etc.)
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TABLE 6-1
DC-10 FAILURE RATE AND COST ASSESSMENT- CATEGORY A
CARBON FIBER STUDY
OPEN BOXESr COATED BOARDSt UNPROTECTED TERMINALS
DC-10 DAILY UTILIZATION -- 8.56 HOURS (t)
AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AVERAGE
REMOVAL REPAI R REPAI R
RATE COST COST IN
_m/1000 IN $ PER $ PER 1000 USAGE
DESCRIPTION FLIGHT HOURS REMOVAL FLT HOURS CLASSIF QPA
CONTROLLER, CABIN PRESSURE, STBY 0.114 181.66 20.71 F . 1
SWITCH, PRESSURE, ANEROI D 0.030 79.51 2.39 F 1
CARGO COMPT TEMP SENSOR 0.036 67.00 2.41 F 3
ZONE TEMP IND SENSOR 0.039 93.00 3.63 F 3
DUCT TEMP IND SENSOR 0.030 91.60 2°75 F 5
FLIGHT GUIDANCE PITCH COMPUTER 2.326 483.83 1125.39 D 2
FLIGHT GUIDANCE ROLL COMPUTER 1.218 520.88 634.43 F 2
FLIGHT GUIDANCE YAW COMPUTER 0.676 236.75 160.04 D 2
HF TRANSCEIVER 1.242 137.33 170.56 D 2
AMPLI FIER, PA 0.854 161.19 137.66 D 2
REPRODUCER, TAPE ANCMT 0.964 81.41 78.48 F 1
MAIN MULTIPLEXER 0.312 188.13 58.70 E 1
SUBMULTIPLEXER 0.442 412.91 182.51 E 2
TIMER/DECODER SECTION 1.848 412.91 763.06 E 8
OVERHEAD DECODER 1.365 82.36 112.42 E 39
1200-VA STATI C I NVE RTE R 0.020 197.38 3.95 D 1
BATTERY CHARGER 0.148 302.39 44.75 D 1
BATTERY VENT PUMP 0.340 50.00 17.00 D 1
TRANSFORMER, INSTRUMENT BUS 0.015 98.00 1.47 D 5
SWITCH ASSY CONTROL, ROLLER 0.240 53.43 53.43 D 2
BATTERY AND LIGHT 0.192 50.00 9.60 D 8
CABIN SMOKE DETECTION IND 0.031 27.60 0.86 D 1
PUMP, AUX AC ELECT. MOTOR DRIVE 0,190 192,11 60,71 D 2
SWITCH, THERMAL 0.054 68.00 3,67 D 1
FLIGHT DATA ENTRY PANEL 0,191 107,30 20.49 D 1
FLIGHT DATA ACQUISITION UNIT 0.200 179.61 35.92 D 1
ANTISKID CONTROL UNIT 0.309 220.12 68.02 F 1
LAMP DIMMER 0.001 86.80 0.09 F 1
CONTROLLER, WARN AND CAUTION 0.252 167,93 42.32 D 1
CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER 1.042 169.18 176.29 D 2
HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR 2.336 570,83 1333.46 D 2
VERTICAL GYRO 0,557 926.91 516.92 D 1
STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR 0.233 361,14 84,15 D 1
RECEIVER, ILS 0.836 202,49 169,28 D 2
WEATHER RADAR RiT UNIT 2,304 133,73 133.73 D 2
WEATHER RAD IND 0,758 166,59 126.28 D 2
RADIO ALTIMETER R/T UNIT 0,590 240,19 141,71 D 2
INERTIAL SENSOR/NAVIGATION UNIT 1,058 1300.00 1375,40 D 2
INERTIAL SENSOR DISPLAY UNIT 0.181 1000,00 181,00 D 1
VOR/ILS RECEIVER 1.352 151.81 205.25 D 2
VO R/I LS RECE IVE R 0.920 278.70 256,40 D 2
VOR RECEIVER 3.252 245,62 798.75 D 2
DME INTERROGATOR 0.778 331,56 257.95 D 2
ADF RECEIVER 0.308 162,62 50.09 D 1
ATC TRANSPONDE R 0,946 284.82 269.44 D 2
AINS 70 NAV COMPUTER 1,476 1500.00 2214,00 D 2
CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT 1,470 1000,00 1470,00 D 2
SWITCH, CONTROL 0,081 306.40 24.82 D 3
LIGHT SWITCH 0.081 24.60 1,99 F 3
CONTROLLER, PNEU SYST 0.936 274.01 256,47 D 3
ENGINE IGNITION SWITCH 0.008 175,60 1.40 D 1
_-_.m _-=$13995,34 143
35.182
(t) = 8.56HOURS/DAY
_P,m(t)
EXPECTED NUMBER OF REMOVALS PER DAY PER AIRCRAFT =
1000
301.159
_;_m(t) = 35.182 x 8.56 = _ = 0.3012
1000
_;REPAIR COST IN $ PER
1000 FLT HOURS x 8,56 x 365 $13,995.34 x 8,56 x 365EXPECTED COST OF REMOVALS PER YEAR PER ACFT = =
1000 1000
= $43,727.04
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TABLE 6-2
DC-10 FAILURE RATE AND COST ASSESSMENT- CATEGORY B
CARBON FIBER STUDY
OPEN BOXES, UNCOATED BOARDS, PROTECTED TERMINALS
DC-10 DAILY UTILIZATION -- 8.56 HOURS (t)
AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AVERAGE
REMOVAL REPAIR REPAIR
RATE COST COST IN
_m/1000 IN $ PER $ PER 1000 USAGE
DESCRIPTION FLIGHT HOURS REMOVAL FLT HOURS CLASSIF QPA
PASSENGER ADDRESS AMPLIFIER 0,908 161,19 146,36 D 2
AUDIO PANEL CONTROL 1,015 87,32 38,86 D 5
MARKER BEACON RECEIVER 0,162 110,99 4.77 D 1
Z;_m _= $189,99 8
2,085
(t) = 8,56 HOURS/DAY
_;_m(t)
EXPECTED NUMBER OF REMOVALS PER DAY PER AIRCRAFT =
1000
17,848
%_.m(t) = 2,085 x 8°56 = _ = 0,018
1000
%REPAIR COST IN $ PER
1000 FLT HOURS x 8,56 x 365 $189,99 x 8.56 x 365
EXPECTED COST OF REMOVALS PER YEAR PER ACFT = =1000 1000
= $593,60
TAB LE 6-3
DC-10 FAILURE RATE AND COST ASSESSMENT-- CATEGORY C
CARBON FIBER STUDY
OPEN BOXES, UNCOATED BOARDSr UNPROTECTED TERMINALS
DC-10 DAILY UTILIZATION = 8.56 HOURS (t)
AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AVERAGE
REMOVAL REPAIR REPAIR
RATE COST COST IN
;_m/1000 IN $ PER $ PER 1000 USAGE
DESCRIPTION FLIGHT HOURS REMOVAL FLT HOURS CLASSIF QPA
HANDSET 0,332 52.13 17.31 F 1
MARKER BEACON RECEIVER 0.162 110.99 17.98 D 1
_.m Z;= $35,29 2
0,494
_Xm(t)
EXPECTED NUMBER OF REMOVALS PER DAY PER AIRCRAFT =
1000
4,229
_.m(t) = 0.494 x 8,56 0,0041000
_'.REPAIR COST IN $ PER
1000 FLT HOURS x 8,56 x 365 $35.29 x 8,56 x 365
EXPECTED COST OF REMOVALS PER YEAR PER AIRCRAFT = =
1000 1000
= $110,26
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TABLE 6-4
DC-9 FAILURE RATE AND COST ASSESSMENT-- CATEGORY A
CARBON FIBER STUDY
OPEN BOXESr COATED BOARDS, UNPROTECTED TERMINALS
DC-9 DAILY UTILIZATION = 7,12 HOURS (t)
AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AVERAGE
REMOVAL REPAI R REPAI R
RATE COST COST IN
_m/1000 IN $ PER $ PER 1000 USAGE
DESCRIPTION FLIGHT HOURS REMOVAL FLT HOURS CLASSIF QPA
HF TRANSCEIVER 1,100 282.00 310.20 D 2
CABIN SPEAKER 0,137 74,00 4,42 D 1
PI LOT'S CALL BELL 0,002 102.00 0,20 F 1
MECHANIC'S CALL HORN 0.013 95.00 1,24 F 1
GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL 0.646 232,00 196,27 D 3
BUS CONTROL PANEL 0.598 288.00 171.65 D 1
AC REGULATOR 0.261 214.00 55.85 D 3
BATTERY VENT FAN 0.031 158,00 4,90 D 1
PROX SW CONTROL 0.215 146,00 31.39 D 1
VERTICAL G_RO 1.659 576.00 955.56 D 1
STANDBY HORIZON INDICATOR 0.226 338.00 76.39 D 1
VOR/I LS RECEIVER 1.950 232.00 452.40 D 3
ADF RECEIVER 0.878 172.00 151,02 - D 2
ATC TRANSPONDE R 0.642 282.00 181.04 D 2
WEATHER RADAR R/T 2.012 326.00 655.91 D 1
WEATHER RADAR INDICATOR 0.657 326.00 214.18 D 1
WEATHER RADAR INDICATOR 0.934 326.00 304.48 D 1
RADIO ALTIMETER R/T UNIT 0.936 204.00 190,94 D 2
_;_m _= $3958.06 28
13.097
(t) = 7.12 HOURS
Z;_.m(t)EXPECTED NUMBER OF REMOVALS PER DAY PER AIRCRAFT =
1000
93,251Z;,km(t) = 13.097 x 712 0.093
1000
Z;REPAIR COST IN $ PER
1000 FLT HOURS x 7.12 x 365 $3958,06 x 7.12 x 365EXPECTED COST OF REMOVALS PER YEAR PER ACFT = =
1000 1000
= $10,286.21
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TABLE 6-5
DC-9 FAILURE RATE AND COST ASSESSMENT - CATEGORY B
CARBON FIBER STUDY
OPEN BOXES, UNCOATED BOARDS, PROTECTED TERMINALS
DC-9 DAILY UTILIZATION -- 7,12 HOURS (t)
AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AVERAGE
REMOVAL REPAIR REPAIR
RATE COST COST IN
_.m/1000 IN $ PER $ PER 1000 USAGE
DESCRIPTION FLIGHT HOURS REMOVAL FLT HOURS CLASSIF QPA
AUDIO PANE L 0.664 90.00 59.76 F 4
JACK PANEL 0.057 90.00 5.13 F 3
FLIGHT COMPT SPEAKER 0.152 109.00 16.37 D 1
FLIGHT INTERPHONE AMPLIFIER 0,072 120.00 8.64 D 2
FLIGHT DI RECTOR COMPUTER 0.848 198.00 167.90 D 2
MARKER BEACON RECEIVER 0.213 120.00 25,56 D 1
ATC TRANSPONDER 0.642 226.00 145.09 D 2
DM E INTE R ROGATO R 0.452 282.00 170.33 D 2
Z;_.m 2;=$598.78 17
3,100
(t) = 7.12 HOURS/DAY
_2_m(t)
EXPECTED NUMBER OF REMOVALS PER DAY PER AIRCRAFT = 1000
22.072
_;_m(t) = 3.100 x 7,12 0,022
1000
2;REPAIR COST IN $ PER
1000 FLT HOURS x 7.12 x 365 $598.78 x 7.12 x 365
EXPECTED COST OF REMOVALS PER YEAR PER ACFT = =
1000 1000
= $1556.11
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TABLE 6-6
DC-9 FAILURE RATE AND COST ASSESSMENT - CATEGORY C
CARBON FIBER STUDY
OPEN BOXES, UNCOATED BOARDS, UNPROTECTED TERMINALS
DC-9 DAILY UTILIZATION = 7,12 HOURS (t)
AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AVERAGE
REMOVAL REPAI R REPAI R
RATE COST COST IN
_m/1000 IN $ PER $ PER 1000 USAGE
DESCRIPTION FLIGHT HOURS REMOVAL FLT HOURS CLASSIF QPA
PASSENGER ADDRESS AMPLIFIER 0.719 148.00 106,41 D 1
WINDSHIELD TEMP CONTROLLER 0.882 183.00 161.41 D 3
MARKER BEACON RECEIVER 0.326 120,00 43.44 D 1
ADF RECEIVER 0,812 226,00 183,51 D 2
_;_.m Z;=$494,77 7
2,739
(t) = 7.12HOURS/DAY
EXPECTED NUMBER OF REMOVALS PER DAY PER AIRCRAFT = Z;_.m(t)
1000
19.502
_Xm(t) = 2,739 x 7,12 0,020
1000
Z;REPAIR COST IN $ PER
1000 FLT HOURS x 7,12 x 365 $494,77 x 7,12 x 365EXPECTED COST OF REMOVALS PER YEAR PER ACFT = =
1000 1000
= $1285.81
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Unscheduled removal rates (Am) have been determined for each LRU based on
actual commercial airline experience. Column one, aircraft removal rate
_m/lO00 flight hours, represents the unscheduled removal rate of the LRU
multiplied by the quantity per aircraft (QPA) shown in column five. Column
one is sunTnedfor each of the categories to show the total unscheduled removal
rate for the aircraft, as is column five to show the total number of LRUs
involved in the assessment. A survey was conducted to determine the average
repair cost involved in an unscheduled removal for each of the LRUs. The
cost includes the labor cost to remove and reinstall the unit in the aircraft,
the cost to transport to and from the repair facility, and the cost to test
and repair the unit as necessary to be serviceable. These costs are listed
for each LRU in the second column entitled average cost in dollars per removal
and reflect a cost of $I0.00 per hour labor and $18.00 per hour burden based
on 1979 dollars. Multiplying column one and column two provides the average
repair cost in dollars per I000 flight hours for each LRU and is listed in
column three. This column is again summedto show the total repair cost per
I000 flight hours for each category. Dividing through by I000 flight hours
Shows the repair cost per flight hour.
The daily utilizatim (the average length of time per day the aircraft
is actually flying) has been determined for the DC-9 as 7.12 hours, and for
the DC-IO as 8.56 hours.
Multiplying the repair cost per flight hour by the daily utilization for
365 days per year provides the expected repair cost per year for each cate-
gory. Summation of the repair cost per year for each category for each air-
craft reveals that the annual repair cost for the DC-IO is $44,431, and for
the DC-9 is $13,128. These are the costs requested by NASAto be provided to
A. D. Little Inc. for use in their computer model to determine cost risk due
to carbon fiber contamination. The average repair cost per unscheduled re-
moval is $100.60 for the DC-IO and $120.87 for the DC-9.
During the investigation and identification of DC-9 and DC-IO components
considered potentially vulnerable to the effects of CF fallout, an evaluation
was made to determine whether any CF-caused failure of these components could
result in a hazard on a subsequent flight, particularly any of a nature that
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could not be coped with using established procedures for accommodating system
anomolies. None were found. The reasons for this finding are discussed below.
I. Certification requirements established by the FAA and other regula-
tory agencies worldwide, as well as the in-house design standards of
Douglas and other manufacturers, require that systems be tolerant of
functional faults or provide for alternative methods to accomplish
the function. All electronically dependent critical functions meet
this requirement.
2. Contamination and moisture from various sources have always been
present on aircraft and have been dealt with for many years. The
sealing/coating protection developed and used on electrical and elec-
tronic equipment to control the more commontypes of contamination
• work equally well against CR as determined by NASAtests. NASAdata
show that avionics equipment with conformal coated circuit boards
and protected terminals is not vulnerable to CF contamination.
3. NASAdata also show that power-generating equipment is not essentially
affected by CF contamination. Further, FAA regulations require
multiple power sources, fault-clearing ability, and the ability for
the aircraft to continue safe flight with all electrical power sources
except the battery inoperative for a time sufficient to reconfigure
or restart the engines, if that was the cause for electrical power
loss. Although CF cannot cause such total loss, this requirement
does ensure that the failure of any single electrical item or likely
combination of items due to CF (or any other cause) can be tolerated
and controlled.
4. No unique failure modes result from CF contamination. As part of
the design and certification process, the effects of equipment fail-
ure modes are analyzed. Failure effects that are generated by CF
fall within the possible failure modes that must be considered in
the design of present equipment.
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5. Prior to flight, a thorough checklist is completed by the flight
crew. If an aircraft is exposed to CF and if any significant system
anomoly results, it is unlikely that it would not be detected prior
to the next flight.
Consequently, in our view there is no discernible additive risk associa-
ted with subsequent operation of an aircraft certified to FAR Part 25 after
it has been exposed to CF fallout.
If some postexposure action is nevertheless felt to be prudent, a manda-
tory cleaning prior to further operation could be imposed. Such action might
be shown to be cost_effective since it could reduce the likelihood of incur-
ring subsequent maintenance costs of any vulnerable nonflight significant
components. NASAdata also indicate that the quanitity of CF that must be
present to result in a significant chance of affecting even very vulnerable
devices would be visibly apparent and thus amenable to cleaning operations.
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